The Annual State Inspection by the National Assembly (ASI), which is not observed outside South Korea, is an institution that the National Assembly oversees the executive branch. This study shows how the ASI impacts the performance of the inspected public organizations and their goal ambiguity moderates the performance impact of the ASI. First, the stringent ASI would reduce the effectiveness of the inspected public organization. However, if the organizational goals were less ambiguous, the negative impact can be minor. Second, there is no statistically significant impact found for efficiency. Third, if the ASI became more stringent, the equity of the inspected public organization can increase, regardless of goal ambiguity. Because the ASI has both positive and negative impacts, it can be said that the ASI is a double-edged sword. These findings could be referred for the constitutional amendment debates and enhance our theoretical understanding of political control.
of South Korea does (Weingast and Moran 1983; Hammond and Knott 1996; Kiser 1999) . 5 This study examines how the ASI affects the organizational performance of an inspected public organization. In addition, it identifies whether the performance impact can be moderated. Goal ambiguity is selected as the moderator because it is one of key conditions that constrains the inspected public organizations as well as the inspecting assemblymen. This study measures the stringency of the ASI by counting the number of requests for rectification in the ASI procedures and analyzes the effect rigorously by adding an instrument variable that can be expected to extinguish endogeneity between the ASI and the organizational performance. This study could provide an overall assessment of the ASI. The assessment could be referred for the constitutional amendment debates and enhance our theoretical understanding of political control.
II. Korean Annual State Inspection
The Early ASI was enumerated in Article 43 of the Constitution of South Korea, when it was promulgated in 1948. It was refined in Articles 72 and 73 of the National Assembly Act, which were enacted in 1948. Two types of institutions were introduced by the State Inspection Act, which was enacted in 1953. One was the regular inspection, and the other was the special inspection. The former was developed into the current ASI, and the latter was evolved into the current special state investigation (SSI). However, the Articles of the Constitution regarding the early ASI were eliminated in the Yushin Constitution of 1972. 6 The SSI and the ASI reappeared in Article 97 of the 1980 Constitution and Article 61 of the 1987 Constitution, respectively. When the Act on the Inspection and Investigation of State Administration (Act) was legislated in 1988, the institutions were revived in current forms.
The ASI has four different characteristics. The first is the directness of the inspectors. The members of the National Assembly join standing committees and conduct the 5. Assemblymen usually require the entire public organizations to submit relevant documentations, and witnesses from the inspected public organizations would be subject to subpoena for further questioning by the members of the National Assembly. By contrast, no such framework can be found in foreign countries, as it would be costly (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, 166) . For instance, the United States government allows poor monitoring, which is compensated by stronger sanctions (Becker and Stigler 1974) . 6. Ultimately, the early ASI disappeared when the State Inspection Act was abolished in 1973. There were opinions that "the members of the National Assembly had abused the system by committing corruption, delaying administrative process of government offices and showing their self-righteousness" (Park 1980, 372) .
inspection individually. Although Article 6 of the Act governs that they can be assisted by private experts in cases of professional issues and outsource the inspection to public officers in the executive branch, they usually employ only clerical services. 7 In other countries, auditing offices, such as the Government Accountability Office of the United States and the National Audit Office of the United Kingdoms, execute the inspection and report to the members of the legislative bodies. However, the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) of South Korea reports to the President as an office of the administrative branch, not to the members of the National Assembly. The inspections by the BAI are conducted separately. The second characteristic is the comprehensiveness of the inspected organizations. Article 7 of the Act provides that governmental organizations, including local governments such as Special Metropolitan, metropolitan cities and provinces, and even quasi-governmental organizations, such as the Public Institutions referred to the Act on the Management of Public Institutions, shall be inspected by the ASI. Since "institutions subject to audits conducted by the BAI under the Board of Audit and Inspection Act are also targets of the ASI (article 7 of the act)", almost every organization that would receive financial assistance from the government may be subject to the ASI. The detailed ASI list of target organizations for the year is defined and examined in advance. However, unless there are special reasons, most are actually being inspected annually through the ASI.
The third characteristic is broad scope of the inspection topics. The Constitution and the Act govern that the ASI is for "overall state affairs." It is not limited to financial auditing. Rather, the ASI focuses on other topics more, as seen in separately established, special session for budget settlement. If the topics of inspections were divided into four categories-financial audits, policy inspections, the inspection of duties, and the roles of ombudsmen-all could be pursued simultaneously during the ASI. 8 For instance, in 2014, an assemblyman had requested departments, their affiliated state agencies, and their affiliated Public Institutions to submit all the documents on the budget, planning, and corruption cases of their employees. There are many articles on bureaucrats who were exhausted with the flood of documents requests from the assemblymen.
The fourth characteristic is the limitedness of the inspection time. Article 2 of the Act governs that the National Assembly shall conduct an annual inspection of overall 7. The directness might be preferred because their activities during the ASI are highly spotlighted by the press. 8. However, topics of the BAI inspection are limited to financial audits and the inspection of duties.
state affairs by competent standing committees, setting a period of not more than 30 days from the date on which the inspection commences before the regular session is convened. Therefore, the state inspection is conducted annually, but the duration is within a 30-day period. The duration could not be extended, regardless of the amount of materials to be reviewed. Moreover, the number of the target public organizations is increasing. Consequently, the time consumption for the ASI per public organizations and witnesses have been reduced, as seen in Table 1 
III. Theory and Hypothesis
The ASI is one of the institutions for political control (Jeong 2003, 195; ). The term "political control" has been frequently used; however, the definition has yet to be found (Moe 1987) . Hood et al. (1999 14, 49 ) defined control as "whatever keeps the state of any given system within some desired subset of all its possible states." In addition, Hood et al. (2004, 5) classified 4 different types of control: oversight, competition, mutuality, and contrived randomness. 9 Nutt and Backoff (1993) and Andrews, Boyne, and Walker (2011, i304 ) explained a typical case of political control: "organizations have priorities set for them," "these priorities change with a new ruling party," and "the fulfillment of political expectations is monitored and managerial 9. Oversight can be found in hierarchist culture-the controller monitors the activities of the controlled and commands them. Competition is easily found, in connection to individualist culture-the rivalry between actors is induced by the controller. Mutuality is associated with egalitarian culture, which would allow the actors in the system to impact each other equally. Contrived randomness is often recognized in fatalist culture-the method is to maintain desirable state of the system by generating arbitrary combination of procedure and actors, to reduce the impact of fatalism (Hood et al. 1999, 14, 49) .
behavior is regulated." The ASI can be understood as an oversight institution to keep bureaucrats work as politicians direct to. Moe (2001) divided studies on political control into two different groups: constitutional management paradigm group and entrepreneurial management paradigm group. The studies of the former positively acknowledge the impact of political control and argue that it is necessary (e.g., Scher, 1963; Bibby and Davidson 1972; Ogul 1976; Dodd and Schott 1979; Weingast 1981 Weingast , 1984 Weingast and Moran 1983; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; McCubbins et al. 1987; Moe 1982) . In contrast, studies on the latter criticize the impact and emphasize the importance of managerial discretion. 10 In this way, British scholars argued, with the term "regulation inside government," that political control over quasi-governmental organizations became problematic following the spread of the New Public Management administrative reform (Hood et al. 1999; Power 1997; James 2000) .
As seen above, various arguments on the impact of control compete. Based upon principal-agent theory, however, the control is expected to have a positive outcome. The theory assumes a contractual relationship between a principal and an agent. The problem is that their individual interests could be in conflict, and the conflict could cause the agent's opportunistic behaviors, such as moral hazard and adverse selection under the circumstance of information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling 1976, 308; Miller 2005) . The principal needs to enforce the agent to honor the contract. The theory focuses on developing optimal strategies for the principal to prevent the agent's opportunistic behaviors (Greer 1994, 14) , which are controls of monitoring and outcome-based incentives. If the controls improve the agent's performance, the below hypothesis could be possible.
[H1] The ASI over public organizations would have positive impacts on their performance.
Control is to achieve a goal. Therefore, goal ambiguity should be considered. It is defined as "the extent to which an organizational goal or set of goals allows leeway for interpretation" (Chun and Rainey 2005) . When a goal invites different interpretations, the goal becomes ambiguous (Kelemen, 2000; Chun and Rainey 2005; Lee, Rainey, and Chun 2010) . If a goal is clear, the control improves the performance, as the control 10. Additionally, they focus on the change of "shifting from [control] systems in which people are accountable for following rules to [control] systems in which they are accountable for achieving results" (Gore 1993, 6-7) .
is expected to reduce the opportunistic behaviors. However, if a goal is ambiguous, the control can fail to reduce the behaviors or rather arouse them. The leeway of interpretation causes inadequate or inappropriate controls to be put in place. In the organization whose goal is ambiguous, professional managers' discretions could be critical, but the controls could hinder their discretions (Weingast and Moran 1983; Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast 1989) . Studying the moderating effect of goal ambiguity is important, as the targets of the ASI are public organizations. Goals of public organizations tend to be more ambiguous than those of private organizations (Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Allison 1983; Downs 1967; Moynihan 2008, 142-145) . The goals of public organizations are given by the legislative branch. However, the need to build the majority coalition tends to make legislators avoid specificity and prefer ambiguity (Lowi 1979; Seidman1986) . In addition, public organizations are expected to hear from various stakeholders, which could create conflicts (Wildavsky 1979, 215) . To reflect all requirements, the goals must be ambiguous. By contrast, private organizations do not need to be prepared for such circumstance, as their goals are relatively simple. Their goals are mostly maximizing their profits.
[H2] The impact of the ASI on the performance of the inspected public organization could be moderated by goal ambiguity of the organizations.
IV. Research Design

A. Data
Based upon the Act, governmental organizations and quasi-governmental organizations are de jure targets of the ASI. This study focuses on state agencies and Public Institutions among them. This study analyzes state agencies, not departments of the central government and local governments, as their functions are comprehensive and complex. It also analyzes the Public Institutions of quasi-governmental organizations because their size is sufficiently large, but their function is relatively simple. Moreover, the disclosed data about them are reliable. In South Korea, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MSF) designates major quasi-governmental organizations as "the Public Institutions" according to the Act on the Management of Public Institutions. In 2015, 316 quasi-governmental organizations were designated.
There are two data sources for this research. The second data source of this research is national archives where codified objective data are disclosed by governmental regulations. This study gathers objective data especially from the websites of state agencies and information system for the Public Institutions of the MSF (aligo.go.kr)-the system contains various organizational information such as HR information, financial information, and regulatory compliance information. In addition, the information system of the National Assembly (likms.assembly.go.kr/inspections) is another archive. All this information is officially released by the government and therefore trustworthy. Additionally, news from a notable portal (news.naver.com) is analyzed to calculate the media exposure levels of the inspected public organizations. If subjective data and objective data are in conflict, the latter are selected.
B. Measurement
The dependent variable in this study is the performance of inspected public organizations. The problem is that performance of the public organizations is difficult to measure (Rainey 2009) . A number of discussions have been made (Matthews 2011) . However, no dominant solution was found. Even though the method to measure could be subjective or objective, 11 it is difficult to utilize objective data when measuring the performance of public organizations with different functions (Brewer and Selden 2000; Vandenabeele 2009; Choi and Rainey 2010) . In such cases, subjective data can be more useful (Dess and Robinson 1984; Venkatraman and Ramanujam 1987; Dollinger and Golden 1992; Delaney and Huselid 1996; McCraken, Mcllwain, and Fottler 2001; Allen and Helms 2002; Schmid 2002) . Therefore, regarding the dependent variable, this study uses survey data from the KPSOS.
In the survey, there are six questions of three groups regarding performance. The first group involves effectiveness. There are two questions about the quality of current services and the development of new services. The second group involves efficiency. The first question is about financial performance, and the second involves labor productivity. The third group deals with equity. The first question is about favoring disadvantaged people, and the second one is about enhancing their quality of life. All answers are calculated on a five-point scale. This study conducted a factor analysis on the six questions, and the results are summarized in Table 2 . Three sub-factors are classified, corresponding with the theoretical concepts of effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. Cronbach's alpha values of three sub-factors are higher than 0.7, and the ratio of cumulative variance is observed as 0.81. Table 2 . Factor analysis of dependent variables
The independent variable in this study is the stringency of the ASI. Previous studies used the frequency or period of the ASI (e.g., Jun, Chun, and Oh 2016) . This study measures the stringency by counting the number of requests for rectification. Hood et al. (1999) explained that procedures of control consist of "standard-setting," "gathering information," and "modifying behavior." During the ASI, assemblymen follow the procedures. Requests for rectification, which are in the third procedure, determine the ASI result (Raaum and Morgan 2001) . The inspected public organizations would modify their plan or establish a new one. Since they must inform the National Assembly on how they resolve the issues, they actively engage with requests for rectification. The stringency of the ASI would be stronger if there were more requests for rectification.
The list of requests for rectification can be found in the reports submitted by the inspected public organizations. The reports are disclosed to the public in the information system of the National Assembly. The ASI is annual; however, this does not mean that every public organization is subject to it annually. Some public organizations can be exempted from the ASI, considering their specific circumstances. Thus, the requests for rectification from two years are accumulated to create a research dataset. The range of the dataset is from 0 to 148. The average is 15.416 and standard deviation is 21.592. However, their skewness is 2.955, which means abnormal distribution. To solve the skewness problem, a 5-point scale variable was designed. The top 20% of public organizations are coded as 5, and the bottom 20% are coded as 1.
In this study, the moderating variable of the performance impact is goal ambiguity. It is a multidimensional concept. Chun and Rainey (2005) suggested that goal ambiguity consists of mission comprehension ambiguity, directive goal ambiguity, priority goal ambiguity, and evaluative goal ambiguity. 12 These four dimensions of goal ambiguity can be measured, either using an objective or subjective method. When various types of public organizations are analyzed, it is difficult to measure their goal ambiguity via a consistent objective method. This study uses subjective data from KPSOS. The questionnaire of the survey consists of four questions on four dimensions of goal ambiguity, respectively. Factor analysis was conducted for the answers from the questionnaire. The eigenvalue is 1.803, the ratio of cumulative variance is 0.45, and Cronbach's alpha is 0.572.
Regarding control variables, other inspection-related variables are added first. The public organizations are also inspected and evaluated by other institutions. To control their effect, the frequency of evaluations by higher offices as well as the frequency of inspections by higher offices and the BAI, which were examined on the KPSOS, are added. Second, variables related to organizational environments are added. The public organizations could be negatively affected by them (Jencks and Phillips 1998; Burtless 1996) . There are various dimensions of environmental restraints. Complexity and turbulence are the most-frequently discussed (Dess and Beard 1984 ; O'Toole and Meier 12. Chun and Rainey (2005) define the four dimensions of goal ambiguity as follows. "Mission comprehension ambiguity refers to the level of interpretive leeway that an organizational mission allows in comprehending, explaining, and communicating the organizational mission. … Directive goal ambiguity refers to the amount of interpretive leeway available in translating an organization's mission or general goals into directives and guidelines for specific actions to be taken to accomplish the mission … Evaluative goal ambiguity refers to the level of interpretive leeway that an organizational mission allows in evaluating the progress toward the achievement of the mission. … Priority goal ambiguity refers to the level of interpretive leeway in deciding on priorities among multiple goals." Table 3 . Measurement of variables 2015), and data from the two dimensions are added from the KPSOS. Third, variables related to organizational resources are added. They reflect the scale of the organization and could lead to a better outcome (Boyne 2003) . For the human resources, the log value of full-time employees is added and for the financial resources, the log value of income is added, using data from the website of the inspected public organization and the management information system. Fourth, the type of the inspected public organization is added. general state agencies as a reference, the executive agency, public corporation, quasi-governmental institution, and non-classified public institution type are added as dummy variables. 13 Fifth, the age of the inspected public organization is added as well to control its accumulated experience of the ASI since their establishment. A public organization with low performance can be subject to the stricter ASI. Therefore, an instrumental variable that affects the stringency but is independent from performance needs to be added to remove the endogeneity. The frequency of media exposures is selected. Media inform citizens and affect citizens' preferences. Thus, politicians, who are working as representatives and want to be re-elected, would pursue more media exposure and increase the control over the public organizations that the media highlight (Drew and Weaver 2001; Althaus et al. 2002) . However, studies that prove the theory of media exposure determining performance of an organization cannot be found. This study creates an instrument variable, based upon the frequency of media exposures of the inspected public organization, by counting the number of times their names appear on 11 major domestic newspapers during 2013 and 2014.
C. Method
This study executes a two-stage least squares analysis. In the first stage, the predicted value of the independent variable is calculated, using the instrumental variable with all control variables. To summarize the results of the first stage analysis, the R-squared value of the model is 0.4596, which could be considered very high. The t-value of the frequency of media exposures, which is the instrumental variable, is 4.17. Generally, if the t-value is no less than 3.3, it could be evaluated as a suitable instrumental variable (Min, 2008) . 4.17 could be sufficiently high to remove the endogeneity. Among other control variables, the t-value of the evaluation by higher offices is -1.85, and the t-value of the income is 3.34, which are statistically significant. For others, no significant relationship is found. On the second stage, the ordinary least squared method is conducted using the predicted value.
To confirm statistical significance of the effect, hierarchical multiple regression analysis is conducted (Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken 2013) . Three different models are created, and the ordinary least squared method is applied. The first one is to check the effect of the control variables and the moderating variable on the dependent variable. In the second one, the independent variables are added. To determine whether the effect 13. These terms are from Korean specific classification of quasi-governmental organizations, according to the Act on the Management of Public Institutions.
of the independent variable is statistically significant, the difference in the R-squared value is assessed. In the third one, the interaction term between the independent variable and the moderating variable is added and the difference in the R-squared value is also examined. If the t-value of the interaction term is sufficiently high and the difference in R-squared is statistically significant, the moderating effect could be considered statistically significant.
V. Empirical Results
This study measures the performance of the inspected public organization from three different perspectives: effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. First, the relationship between the stringency of the ASI and effectiveness is explained in Table 4 . The R-squared value for Models 1, 2, and 3 are 0.12, 0.14, and 0.16, respectively. All differences in the values of R-squared are statistically significant at a 5% significance level. In Model 1, there are no other variables with statistical significance, except for complexity. 14 When the independent variable is included in Model 2, it is verified that it has a statistically significant negative impact. Additionally, the variables of complexity and human resources have positive effects. When a moderating variable is added in Model 3, it is verified that both the independent variable and the interaction term have negative effects.
It can be summarized that the ASI has negative impact on the effectiveness of the inspected public organization and goal ambiguity may moderate the degree of its influence. Figure 1 shows the moderating effect of goal ambiguity in detail. The ASI has a negative impact on effectiveness when the degree of goal ambiguity is high or low. However, it is also noted that there is a difference in the scale of the influence, considering the cases of high or low goal ambiguity. It has less of a negative impact on the effectiveness in the inspected public organizations with low goal ambiguity. Therefore, the negative impact of the ASI on the effectiveness may diminish as goal ambiguity decreases, and it could be more problematic in the inspected public organization of which organizational goals are ambiguous.
The analysis of the relationship between the stringency of the ASI and efficiency 14. Andrew (2009) theorized that complexity might have negative effect on organizational performance; however, this study shows the positive correlation between two factors-while the survey asked about the characteristics of clients' diversified requests, it can be presumed that the survey respondents replied on how they responded to the requests. Table 4 . Impact on effectiveness Figure 1 . Moderating effect on effectiveness is summarized in Table 5 . There is a small increase of R-squared values in Models 4, 5, and 6. The differences are statistically significant at the significance level of 1%. Considering Model 4, there are no other variables with statistical significance, except for goal ambiguity, human resources, and public corporation-all show similar results to precedent research. The results confirm that there are negative impacts of goal ambiguity and human resources, and a positive impact of public corporations. 15 In Model 5, the impact of independent variable cannot be verified with statistical significance. In addition, the change in the control variable is minimal. In Model 6, both the independent variable and the moderating variable cannot represent statistically significant results. Table 6 summarizes the results of the hierarchical multiple regression analysis that tests the relationship between the stringency of the ASI and equity. R-squared values for Models 7, 8, and 9 are 0.17, 0.20, and 0.20, respectively . The difference is statistically significant, at the significance level of 1%. Considering Model 7, there are no other variables with statistical significance, except for complexity and the age of the inspected public organization. In Model 8, it is confirmed that the stringency of the ASI, as the independent variable, has a positive impact on equity. Also, the impact of goal ambiguity, as the moderating variable, cannot be verified with statistical significance in Model 9, while the independent variable still shows a positive impact on equity. In other words, the ASI has a positive impact on equity, regardless of goal ambiguity.
15. Public Corporations secure the major portion of their profit from businesses, such as utility and infrastructure projects. Considering the fact, it can be concluded that the presumption that Public Corporations would be high performers is true. Table 6 . Impact on equity
VI. Conclusion
This study shows how the ASI impacts the performance of the inspected public organizations and their goal ambiguity moderates the impact of the ASI on the performance. Looking at the characteristics of performance via three different perspectives, which would be effectiveness, efficiency, and equity, the following results are acquired through the analysis. First, the stringent ASI would reduce the effectiveness of the inspected public organization. However, if the organizational goals were less ambiguous, the negative impact on effectiveness can be minor. Second, there is no statistically significant impact found for efficiency. Third, if the ASI became more stringent, the equity of the inspected public organization can increase. Since the moderating effect of goal ambiguity is not found, it is confirmed that equity is consistently increasing, regardless of its goal ambiguity. Because it has both positive and negative impacts, it can be said that the ASI is a double-edged sword. However, it should be noted that the negative impact on effectiveness with clear organizational goals could be smaller, so that the ASI on the public organizations with clear goals can boost equity without side effects.
The finding regarding the impact on effectiveness is contradictory to the theoretical prediction based on the principal-agent theory. Why does the ASI reduce effectiveness? There are two possible reasons. First, the assemblymen may not possess proper expertise as a controller-in such case, the control can hinder the managerial discretion and may generate adverse effects (Weingast 1984; Moe 1984; Boyne, Day, and Walker 2002) . Second, the assemblymen may act opportunistically. The assemblyman is not only a principal to the inspected public organizations, but also an agent of the citizens-the assemblymen may commit principal-agent problems, such as moral hazard and adverse selection. For instance, they could demand the public organizations do what contributes to their own interest, not to the interest of the citizens. 16 In addition, why is no statistically significant impact on efficiency observed? First, there might be conflicts among the requests for rectification due to a lack of consistency in the case of multiple principals (Moe 1984; Douma and Schreuder, 1992; Barrow 1996; Whitford 2005) . Since the positive impact would be diminished when conflicts exist (Boyne 2003) , no statistically significant results could be found from the linear regression analysis. Second, it might be due to hidden characteristics of public 16. Allegedly, sometimes the assemblymen delivered harsh criticism without merit at the site of the ASI to attract sufficient media exposures and to fundraise from the supporters (MBC, 2015.09.24.) .
organizations, where residual value as an agent is small. Efficiency cannot be improved in public organizations, as much as in private organizations for this reason: the ASI would affect public organizations insignificantly. This argument is supported by the observation of the efficiency enhancement of public corporations, which are similar to private organizations. This study empirically verifies the impact of the ASI, as well as the moderating effect of goal ambiguity. Additionally, it provides foundational data, which would be useful to improve the institutional design of the ASI. Outlined in the introduction, there are many discussions on the ASI, which cannot be confirmed due to the scarcity of empirical studies on the subject. Based upon the results of this study, the argument for the abolishment of the ASI might not be justified, as there is a positive impact on equity. However, institutional improvement of the ASI is required to resolve the issue of the negative impact on effectiveness. If regular oversight hearings, which were recently discussed, were to replace the ASI, it should be explored further, on how the hearings could internalize the positive characteristics of the ASI, while minimizing the effect of negative properties.
